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The

CONSIDERATIONS

On the Expediency of admitting

REPRESENTATIVES
FROM THE AMERICAN COLONIES

I N T O

The British House of Commons.

[Price ONE SHILLING.]

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ON THE
EXPEDIENCY
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REPRESENTATIVES
FROM THE AMERICAN COLONIES
INTO
The British House of Commons.

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

CONSIDERATIONS, &c.

WH O E V E R has considered the relation between the British subjects residing in America and those residing in Great-Britain, must, as I conceive, be ready to acknowledge that there is something of inequality and hardship in the condition of the former, if their property may be granted away by any Assembly, how great and respectable soever, in the constitution of which they are permitted to take no part. I do not mean that this circumstance can be the ground of an exemption of the Americans from the authority of the British Parliament in matters of any kind, whether taxation or legislation, that being the supreme legislature of the

British nation : for I well know that the subjects of the Crown of Great-Britain must continue to be so in every respect in all parts of the world, while they live under the protection of the British Government ; nor can their crossing the Atlantick Ocean with the King's licence, and residing in America for the purposes of trade, affect their legal subjection to the governing powers of the community to which they belong : and it is much to be lamented, that any of the American Colonies have carried their claims so far.

BUT yet the total want of Representatives in the great Council of the nation, to support their interests and give an assent on their behalf to laws and taxes by which they are bound and affected, is a misfortune which every friend to liberty and equal government must be sorry to see them labour under, and from which he must wish them to be relieved in a regular and constitutional manner, if such relief can possibly be afforded them without breaking the unity of the British Government. I put
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in this restriction, because otherwise the cure would be worse than the disease. For what friend either to Great-Britain or America, that has bestowed any attention upon this subject, can bear for a moment to think of disuniting the subjects of the Crown, and splitting the widely-extended territories of this yet-compacted empire into so many distinct and separate states, independent of, and co-ordinate with, each other, and connected together by no other tie but that of owing an allegiance to the same Sovereign, which is no other than the relation in which Hanover has stood to Great-Britain ever since the accession of the present royal family? And this allegiance would in many of the provinces be little more than a nominal subjection, as the Crown has divested itself of almost the whole of its executive power by the charters it has granted to those provinces. Such a disunion would be a dreadful event both to Great-Britain and America; but more, if possible, to America than to Britain, as it would leave the several governments there at liberty to break out into violences against each other, and to prosecute

prosecute to the utmost extremities of war and desolation the numerous grounds of animosity and dissension that subsist among them, partly upon their different opinions in religion, partly upon the boundaries of their respective territories, partly upon their rivalry in trade, and partly upon the claims of the proprietaries of some of the provinces upon the freeholders, by many deemed odious and exorbitant ; besides the confusions that would arise in many of them from the imperfect constitution of their governments, which are not adapted to the condition of independent states. These would be great and real evils—far greater than the danger (which perhaps is but imaginary, though it has been so much insisted on by the Americans) of their being oppressed with unreasonable taxes by a British Parliament in which they have no Representatives. For there are two reasons that induce me to think that these dreadful apprehensions of oppression have but little ground. The first is, that as the riches and welfare of Great-Britain depend almost intirely upon the trade
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to America, the British Parliament would never, for its own sake, impose unreasonable burthens on the Americans, because by such a measure that trade must be immediately affected: and, if it should be supposed that the landed gentry in Parliament might be inclined to do so, all the numerous body of merchants that trade to America, together with the manufacturers whom they employ, whose numbers and weight are such (as the American writers tell us) as to have been the principal cause of repealing the stamp-act, would instantly become advocates for the Americans, as much as if they had been chosen to represent them: and by this means the inhabitants of America would be nearly in the same condition with the unrepresented, or non-electing, inhabitants of Great-Britain itself. The second reason is, that the American Provinces are already too powerful to be the objects of wanton oppression, though Great-Britain should not be restrained by the foregoing motive of an immediate common interest with them: and they are daily growing more populous
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and powerful by very quick degrees; whereas the numbers of inhabitants in Great-Britain are, on the most favourable supposition, at a stand; and, from the luxury of the times, are generally thought to be decreasing. This growing strength of their country is often the boast of the Americans, and is mentioned by them as a reason why they will not submit to be taxed and governed by the British Parliament; but to me it seems to give room to a different conclusion, and that it ought rather to operate as a reason for such submission, since it affords them a moral certainty that the Parliament will never venture to exercise such an authority over them in an unjust or oppressive manner, even though it should have been recognized by them in the fullest and strongest terms. Yet, as it is a disagreeable and degrading idea to a freeman in a popular government, as many of the American Governments are in a high degree, to be liable to be taxed and have laws imposed upon him at the pleasure of others, without any consent of his own given either by himself or his representatives, it would be both equitable

equitable and expedient to endeavour, if possible, to remove this inconvenience, and raise them to a level with their fellow-subjects in Great-Britain.

Now the natural and obvious way of doing this, and which is likewise agreeable to precedents of very respectable authority, is to admit the American Colonies to a share in the public Councils of the nation, by sending Members to the British Parliament. I know there are difficulties attending such a project (arising principally from the distance at which the American Provinces are situated) which many people are apt to consider as unsurmountable: but I could never see any reason for thinking them so; nor have those who have censured this project as impracticable, offered to substitute any other in its place that is more easy to be carried into execution, or more likely to give the Americans satisfaction. To describe the method by which I conceive this project of admitting Representatives from America into the British Parliament might be effected with sufficient advantage to the

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Americans, and to obviate the principal objections that are likely to be made to it, is the design of the following pages.

ABOUT fourscore persons might be admitted to sit in Parliament, as Members of the Commons House of Parliament, for all the King's dominions in America, the West Indies as well as North America; and their title might be that of *Commissioners of the Colonies of America*. This number would be about four Members for each separate Colony upon an average: but they should not all send exactly the same number of Representatives; but some should send only two, others four, others five or six, and Pennsylvania perhaps eight: the appointment of the numbers to be sent by each Colony being to be settled by an act of Parliament upon a due consideration of their extent, wealth, numbers of inhabitants, and contribution to the public expences of the nation.

THESE Members should be permitted to sit in the House of Commons without
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having 300*l.* a year in land, or any other pecuniary qualification, as is allowed with respect to the Scottish Members, and those for the two universities of Oxford and Cambridge.

THEY should be chosen every year on a certain appointed day, which might be the first of August, by the Assemblies of the several Provinces for which they were to be Commissioners. And this should be done of course, without the King's writ of summons.

ON these occasions they should receive a commission in writing from their electors, expressed, as near as may be, in the words of the writ of summons, and consequently empowering them to sit and vote in the British House of Commons, and consult with the King and the great men of the kingdom and the Commons of the same in Parliament assembled, upon the great affairs of the nation, and to consent, on the behalf of the province for which they are chosen, to such things as shall be ordained in the Parlia-

ment, in all such meetings thereof as shall be holden by the King, his heirs and successors, from the day of their election until the same day in the following year, and further until such time as another commission of the same kind shall be given by the said Assembly either to them or to other persons in their stead, to represent the said Province for another year, and shall be produced and read in the British House of Commons. Two or more original commissions of this kind should be sent over to England by different ships, in order to guard against accidents of the sea : and there would be a moral certainty that at least one of them would always be in England before the first day of November.

FURTHER, though the authority of the British Parliament, especially when it should have been thus augmented by the admission of these Commissioners from the American Colonies, must be allowed to be supreme and incontestable, and all their acts of every kind must be intitled to universal obedience; yet, I conceive, it would be a proper rule
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to be observed in practice and to be made a standing order of both Houses of Parliament, never to pass any law, whether for imposing a tax or for regulating trade, or for any other purpose whatsoever, relating to any of the American Colonies, till one whole year after the first reading of the bill; unless it be to renew some expiring laws of great importance, and of immediate and urgent necessity, such as the act for billeting the King's troops, and perhaps some few others, that might be specially excepted in the order. The observation of this rule would give the several Colonies that were likely to be affected by the intended law an opportunity of making proper representations against it, and would consequently be the means of preventing the Parliament from making injudicious laws, not suited to the condition of the Colonies, from want of proper information concerning them; the danger of which is one of the principal reasons alledged by the American writers against the expediency of the British Parliament's undertaking to make laws for America.

LASTLY,

LASTLY, this legislative power of the Parliament should be exercised but seldom, and on occasions of great necessity. Whatever related to the internal government of any particular Colony (such as raising the necessary taxes for the support of its civil government, and passing laws for building bridges, or churches, or barracks, or other public edifices) should be left to the Governor and Assembly of that Colony to transact among themselves, unless in cases where the domestic dissensions of the Colony put a stop to public business, and created a kind of necessity for the interposition of the supreme legislature. But when any general tax was to be imposed upon all the American Colonies for the support of a war, or any other such general purpose; or any new law was to be made to regulate the trade of all the Colonies; or to appoint the methods by which debts owing from the inhabitants of one Colony to those of another, or of Great-Britain, should be recovered; or to direct the manner of bringing criminals to justice who have fled from one Colony into another; or to settle the manner of quartering the
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King's troops in the several Colonies ; or of levying troops in them, and the number each Colony should contribute ; or to settle the proportional values of different coins that should be made current in the several Provinces ; or to establish a general paper-currency throughout America ; or for any other general purpose that relates to several Colonies ; in these cases the authority of Parliament should be employed, and would be found to be a blessed bond of union to all the various dominions of which the British empire is now composed.

SUCH is the plan upon which I conceive the present disputes with America may be equitably terminated, to the lasting and solid advantage of both parties, or perhaps I ought rather to say, to the prevention of the utter ruin of them both, since nothing less seems likely to be the consequence of carrying the present dissensions to a rupture. *Si collidimur, frangimur.* For though Great-Britain may be able, just at present, to enforce her authority over the Americans without admitting them to send Members to the British Parliament,

Parliament, yet the submission that would be the consequence of such an exertion of her power, would not be a happy end of these disputes. An opinion of injury and ill treatment would remain rooted in their breasts, and the animosity it has already excited against Great-Britain would be only increased by our success against them, and the misfortunes they would have suffered in the contest. Who can tell whether it might not drive them, in a fit of rage and indignation, to call in the assistance of our natural enemies the French to enable them to become intirely independent of us? or at least to resolve, when another generation or two shall have doubled or quadrupled their numbers, to renew the contest with their own strength, in order to regain what they consider as so essential a part of their liberty? This would be the effect of success in this wretched contention. The consequence of a contrary issue of it would be the immediate independence of the Colonies on Great-Britain in every other point as well as taxation, which would probably be soon followed by the loss of her trade and the ruin

ruin of her public credit. But if Great-Britain offers the Americans the foregoing, or any other, plan of an equitable union with herself, it may be hoped that they will thankfully accept it, and that a cordial affection will take place again, as heretofore, between the subjects of the Crown on this and the other side of the water. At least we may suppose that the Southern and middle Colonies, and the West India islands, and likewise Nova Scotia and Quebec, would be glad of such an offer; and then perhaps the Provinces of New England, if they should not be pleased with it, might not think it prudent for themselves alone to engage in a contention with the power of Great-Britain.

' It remains that I take notice of several objections which are likely to be made to the foregoing proposal, and mention the respective answers which I apprehend may justly be given to them.

IN the first place it has been said, as an objection to the admission of Representatives

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from America into the British Parliament, that when Parliaments are to be convened on a sudden upon some great and unforeseen emergency, there will not be time to send notice of such meetings to the Americans, so that their Members may attend.

THIS objection is removed in the foregoing plan, by providing that it shall not be necessary to send the King's writ of summons across the Atlantic Ocean every time a new Parliament is to meet; but that these Commissioners of the Colonies shall be chosen every year on a certain day appointed for that purpose, to wit, the first of August, whether a Parliament is then in being or not, so that they will always be ready to attend their duty in Parliament whenever the King thinks proper to call one. And if the Parliament should by an extraordinary chance happen to sit for the dispatch of business during the interval between the end of the year for which they are chosen and the arrival of the next commission in England, that is, between the first of August and about the first of October (which would

would not happen once in fifty years) the Colonies would not be unrepresented even during that interval, though the new Commission would be then at sea; because it is provided that the Commissioners of the former year shall sit and vote during such interval, or until the arrival and publication of the new commissions.

ANOTHER objection is, that it would be highly inconvenient to the Representatives so chosen by the Colonies to be forced to cross the ocean twice a year, to the hazard of their healths and lives, the loss of a third part of their whole time, and the consequent neglect of their private affairs.

THE answer is, that according to the foregoing plan they may be chosen in their absence, and consequently need not cross the sea at all. By this means also they may continue in England the whole year, and be constantly ready to give their attendance at every meeting of Parliament that shall be called.

A THIRD objection is, that it would be too great a burthen of expence upon many of the Colonies, especially the Northern ones, to pay their Commissioners such wages or salaries as would be necessary to induce them to undertake the office, and to enable them to maintain a decent appearance in England as Members of the British Parliament; which could not well be less than 1000 *l.* a year to each Commissioner.

IN answer to this objection, which is much more plausible than the former ones, it may be observed in the first place, that many of the American provinces, as, for instance, the West India islands, the Carolinas, Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, could well enough afford this expence of a few thousand pounds a year to reward the services of their Commissioners. And, if they could afford it, it would certainly be money extremely well laid out, and would be returned to them with advantage by the zeal and activity with which their interests would be supported in Parliament.

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AND secondly, as to those Colonies which could not well afford such an expence, it may be answered, that they could easily find persons who would undertake these honourable employments without any pecuniary recompence.

I KNOW it will be here said, and with truth, that there is not on the continent of North America, or at least in the Northern half of it, an order of gentry, as in Old England, that is, of persons of liberal education and easy patrimonial fortunes sufficient to enable them to undertake honourable offices for the service of their country without any pecuniary advantage; —that the richest people among them are their merchants, who cannot neglect their trade without running the risque of being ruined;—that their landholders, though many of them own large tracts of land of thirty or forty thousand acres, yet are either forced to keep their land in their own hands, and cultivate it by negroe slaves, which requires their own continual presence and superintendance; or, if they let it to
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tenants, to let it at such very low rates, that they are unable to undertake so expensive an employment as that of a Commissioner to the British Parliament without a salary ;— and therefore that these Colonies will not be able to procure such Commissioners.

BUT to this it may be answered, in the first place, that in some of those Colonies there is an order of gentry very evidently rising up, that in a couple of generations will produce a considerable number of persons of sufficient patrimonial fortunes for the purpose here mentioned ; more especially in the provinces of New York and New Jersey, where the English law of inheritance by primogeniture takes place.

AND secondly, supposing that there neither now is, nor ever will be in time to come, in the Colonies themselves a sufficient number of persons able and willing to undertake these employments gratis, yet there are numbers of gentlemen in England who would be glad to undertake them, and would esteem themselves highly honoured
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by the Colonies which should think fit to chuse them; and many of these gentlemen might be as fit for these employments, and as likely to serve their constituents with zeal and fidelity, as the natives of America themselves. Three sorts of persons occur to me upon this occasion as likely to answer this description.

THE first sort consists of such persons as have been governours, or lieutenant-governours, or chief justices, or commanders of garrisons or of regiments, or officers of the Crown in any other office of trust or importance, and who have gained the confidence and good opinion of the inhabitants of the Colonies in which they have served during their continuance in their offices, but are since returned to England to spend the remainder of their days in their native country. These gentlemen would be well acquainted with the circumstances of the Colonies they had belonged to, their constitutions, genius, laws, and trade, and would be the most able and intelligent Commissioners in Parliament that they could
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chuse: and it may well be supposed that they would likewise retain an affection for the people amongst whom they had spent a considerable part of their lives, and from whom they had received so honourable a mark of confidence and esteem.

THE second sort consists of the English merchants, residing at London or elsewhere in England, who trade to the several Colonies in America. These persons would understand at least the mercantile interests of the Colonies they traded to, and would be sincerely concerned for their welfare, with which their own interests would have so close a connection; as is experienced at this present time in the zeal with which the London merchants concerned in the trade to America support the claims of the Americans. And there is no doubt that these English merchants would gladly undertake the office of Commissioners of the Colonies, to which they traded, in the British Parliament without a salary.

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THE third set of Persons who would, as I conceive, be glad to undertake these employments without a salary, are English gentlemen of independent fortune; who would, as I conjecture, employ part of their wealth in the purchase of landed estates in the American Colonies, and would go and reside upon them for a few years, in order to acquire a knowledge of the concerns of the Provinces in which they were situated, and recommend themselves to the inhabitants of those Provinces as fit persons to represent them in the British Parliament. This would be of advantage to the Provinces in which these purchases were made, in two respects: first, by the money it would bring into those Provinces to make the purchases with, which would quicken trade and industry: and secondly, by promoting a friendly intercourse between the inhabitants of those Provinces and those of Great-Britain, when the same persons would often be proprietors of land in both countries, and consequently would have occasion to go from the one to the other to inspect the condition of their property, which would

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doubtless be followed by personal friendships between the residents of both countries and their respective families, and often by inter-marriages; which are grounds and means of union that ought by no means to be disregarded by two remote branches of the same nation that sincerely desire to continue under the same dominion.

FROM some of these three classes of men residing in Great-Britain the Americans would always be able to chuse a sufficient number of intelligent and faithful Commissioners to represent them in the British Parliament.

A FOURTH objection to this proposal arises from the bad opinion the Americans in general entertain of the Members of the British Parliament. They say that corruption is openly practised in it;—that no Member of Parliament is at all ashamed to take a place or pension to betray his trust, and vote as the Minister directs;—and that, this being the prevailing fashion, there is reason to apprehend that the Members that should be
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chosen to represent the Colonies, if the foregoing plan were adopted, whether Americans or Englishmen, would fall in with it, like their neighbours, and endeavour to advance their private fortunes by sacrificing the interests of their constituents.

IN answer to this objection, I might question the truth of the fact on which it is grounded, the extreme corruption of the Members of the British Parliament. At least I cannot allow it to be true in the extent in which the Americans represent it, as if the House of Commons in their public actions had no regard at all to the interest of their country or the duties of their trust, but were ready to pass any iniquitous laws to the prejudice of public liberty, and to grant any sums of money however exorbitant without any apparent necessity, to the prejudice of the property of their constituents, whenever the King's Ministers should require them so to do.

IT is certain that no such laws have been passed at the instigation of the Ministers,

and that no such grants as are above mentioned have been made, unless perhaps in the single instance of the sum of 513,000 l. granted to his present Majesty for the discharge of the debts of his civil list. And in this case I can easily suppose that a motive of compassion for the numbers of innocent persons who would otherwise have been sufferers from that load upon his Majesty's revenue, and an affectionate desire of relieving their excellent Sovereign (who has in no instance endeavoured to violate the liberties of his subjects) from the unworthy straights and inconveniences, ill becoming the royal dignity, into which some of his Ministers had brought him by the injudicious management of his revenue, may have induced many Members of the House of Commons to consent to this grant, without any view to their own private interest; though at the same time I acknowledge it to be, considering all its circumstances, a dangerous compliance, and not worthy to be drawn into example.

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AND as to the other fact which has been made the ground of such severe censures upon the House of Commons, the expulsion and incapacitation of Mr. Wilkes to sit in the present Parliament, it is a matter of so much nicety and difficulty, supported so well by usage and precedents, and a general acquiescence of the people under the power of expulsion exercised by the House of Commons from the year 1580 to the year 1711, without an endeavour to re-elect the expelled Members, or any traces of an opinion in the Members themselves that were expelled, that they were capable of being re-elected, and confirmed in that year by a decision of the House of Commons in the case of Sir Robert Walpole (which was never afterwards reversed or publicly censured, notwithstanding the subsequent changes of the times and Sir Robert's long continuance in power) that an expelled Member was incapable of being re-elected during the same Parliament: I say, the doctrine that has prevailed was so well supported by all these circumstances, that I am persuaded that numbers of those who
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voted in support of Mr. Wilkes's incapacity did it upon full conviction that they were doing right, and that they were bound to vote in that manner by the law and usage of Parliament. I mention this only to justify the conduct of many Members of the House of Commons in a moral view, by observing that it is probable they meant to do right on that occasion, and not to insinuate that the judgment they passed on this subject was free from error, or that every expulsion of a Member of the House of Commons creates, or ought to create, in him an incapacity of being re-elected to serve in the same Parliament ; or even that the House of Commons is rightfully possessed of any power of expelling a Member at all upon a pretence of unfitness or unworthiness, or for any crime whatever that is committed out of the House, and is cognizable by the ordinary courts of law : all which has always appeared to me, as it now seems to be generally esteemed by the body of the nation, to be an arbitrary, unnecessary, and dangerous power illegally assumed by them over each other, and over
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the rights of their electors; and I heartily wish it may be taken away (now that the evil tendency of it is generally understood and complained of) together with the power exercised by them of imprisoning their fellow-subjects that are not members of their body, by an act of the whole legislature in some future session of Parliament. But the exercise of it in the case of Mr. Wilkes ought not to be mentioned as a proof of the corruption of the House of Commons and of their readiness to sacrifice the dearest interests and franchises of their constituents to the arbitrary directions of a Minister.

THESE are the only two instances of the corruption of the present House of Commons brought by the most formidable arraigner of their conduct, the ingenious author of the *Thoughts on the Causes of the present Discontents*: and therefore we may safely conclude that no other has existed. But if there were many, and those not capable of being justified in any degree, what ought to be the consequence? not, surely,

surely, that the Americans should separate themselves from their fellow-subjects of Britain and refuse to send their Delegates, when invited to do so by proper authority, to the general and supreme Council of the nation: but that all the subjects of the empire in every part of it should join in endeavouring by every legal method to obtain a redress of so important a grievance and restore the vigour of the constitution; either by making the elections for Members of Parliament annual; or by making the Members, who are properly the attornies of the people who chuse them, liable to be changed, like other attornies, at the pleasure of their constituents; or by disqualifying persons who have places, or pensions, during the pleasure of the Crown, from sitting in Parliament; or (since these, which are the most obvious remedies for this dangerous state-disease, do not seem to be approved by those who complain most of its malignity) by such other methods, hitherto unknown, as shall be thought most adequate to the nature and magnitude of the evil. But in
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the mean time the Americans v'll surely have no reason to complain, if they are put upon the same footing with their brethren in Great-Britain, and partake of the benefits of the British constitution, imperfect as it may be, as it exists in the center and heart of the empire.

THIS I conceive to be a sufficient answer to the fourth objection. But further, by the foregoing plan the Americans will have an advantage over their fellow-subjects of Great-Britain : for they will have the privilege of chusing their Commissioners to the British Parliament every year, notwithstanding the Representatives for Great-Britain should continue to be chosen only once in seven years. Now this advantage is allowed them in order to counterbalance the inconvenience arising from their distance from the scene of action in which their Representatives will be engaged, who might otherwise, being so far removed from the inspection and conversation of their constituents, be induced to forget, neglect, or sacrifice their interests. But with this con-

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tinual dependence upon them for an annual re-election, I conceive they would ever be attentive to their interests, and careful to preserve their good opinion.

A FIFTH objection to the above-mentioned proposal is, that though the Commissioners for the American Provinces should continue honest and faithful to their trust, yet their integrity would be of little use to their constituents, because there is reason to apprehend that in every question relating to any new tax, or other burthen, to be imposed on America, the Members for Great-Britain would all unite against them and out-vote them.

Now, in answer to this objection, I would only desire those who make it to consider the case of Scotland. Only forty-five Members are admitted into the British House of Commons as Representatives for Scotland; that is, about one thirteenth part of the whole number of which the House consists: yet this number is found to be amply sufficient to protect the interests of
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that part of the united kingdom against the oppression of the other. And indeed no attempt has been made, nor, as it should seem, has even a wish been ever entertained by their more numerous English neighbours, to oppress them. On the contrary, they enjoy advantages by the treaty of union above the English; for, though the extent of their country is more than one fourth of the whole island, and the number of their people more than a sixth part of the whole people, and the number of their Representatives in the House of Commons is more than one thirteenth part of the whole House, yet they pay only the fortieth part of the land-tax paid by the whole island. And, though the value of their lands has, during the last five-and-twenty years, been constantly increasing at a vast rate, much faster than that of land in England, yet no endeavour has been made to increase their proportion of this public burthen. And in a great variety of instances the interest of Scotland has been consulted and promoted by the British Parliament since the happy

union of the two kingdoms in Queen Anne's reign. And it will not be disputed that the inhabitants of that part of the island have likewise ever enjoyed, and continue still to enjoy, their full share of the favours of the Crown in preferments of various kinds in all parts of the British dominions.

Now, since forty-five Members chosen into the British House of Commons for Scotland, acting zealously for the good of their constituents and countrymen, are able to procure such advantages for them; why should it be apprehended that a body of fourscore Members sitting in the same House for the several Colonies in America, and made more dependent upon their constituents by the necessity of being annually re-elected, would not be able to procure similar advantages for the Colonies for which they would be chosen? Surely no good reason can be given for entertaining such a doubt.

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AND further, the experiment has been already tried in some degree with respect to America itself, and the event has been found to be highly beneficial to it. For, though no Members have hitherto been chosen by any of the Colonies in America, yet several of the rich proprietors of the West India islands, who have resided in England, have been elected into Parliament for English boroughs: and even in this mode of admission they have been thought to have had sufficient influence in Parliament to obtain many important favours for that part of America with which they were connected; so as even to excite the jealousy of their northern neighbours on the continent of North America. For the latter have often complained of the partiality shewn by the mother-country to the West India islands in matters relating to the trade of America, and have ascribed it to the very circumstance here mentioned of their having several of their principal proprietors elected into the British House of Commons. Surely therefore the admission of a considerable number of Commissioners into the House

House of Commons, regularly chosen by the several Colonies themselves, and continually dependent upon them for a re-election the next year, could not fail of being an effectual security to those Colonies against any unjust or oppressive proceedings of the Parliament of Great-Britain.

THE sixth and last objection that, I imagine, will be made to this proposal is, that though it should be allowed to be a proper measure, yet it ought only to be taken at the humble request of the several Colonies of America in memorials preferred to the King's Majesty in his high court of Parliament, setting forth their intire obedience to the authority of the Parliament, as the supreme legislature of the nation, and their readiness to submit to any laws or taxes that have been, or shall be, imposed by it, and then representing their own great numbers and the great share they endure of the public burthens of the state by their large consumption of British manufactures, and the degree in which, by many different methods,

methods, they contribute to its support, and urging the reasonable and equitable right they derive from these circumstances to the privilege of having some share in the public counsels and deliberations of the nation by which they are so deeply affected, and therefore praying his most excellent Majesty to put them upon the same footing with their fellow-subjects residing in Great-Britain, by permitting them to send Members to Parliament.

THIS, I confess, would be the most decent, proper, and constitutional way of proceeding in this matter, and would be agreeable to the example of the bishoprick of Durham on the like occasion in the reign of King Charles the Second. But if, as we have reason to apprehend is now the case, America is too much divided and torn by factions, and too much disgusted with Great-Britain, to proceed in this regular manner, shall the thing remain undone for that reason only, and the harmony and happiness of both countries be thus sacrificed to a punctilio? No, certainly. Let Great-Britain

Britain rather for once descend a little from her dignity, and comply in this, not important, circumstance with the froward humour of the Americans. Let her make the above propofal, or some other more wisely contrived, but founded on the same principles of equity, to every British Colony in America without further delay, by passing an act of Parliament to empower the several Colonies to send the proper number of Commissioners to the British House of Commons within the year next following the date of the act. It is probable that many of the Colonies will immediately comply with the propofal, and send their Representatives to Parliament: and if they do, it may reasonably be supposed that the other Colonies will not long refuse to follow their example. But if they should not, and likewise should persist in disclaiming the authority of the British Parliament, we may at least expect this good consequence from having made them the offer, that it will unite the inhabitants of Great-Britain in their endeavours to subdue them. In the present state of things their indignation
 against

against the Americans, for their violent opposition to the authority of Parliament, seems to be checked and blunted by a generous consciousness and fellow-feeling of the hardship the Americans will labour under in their future subjection to Great-Britain, if they are to be taxed without their own consent. But after such an offer and the contemptuous refusal of it by any of the Colonies, we may well suppose that they will act as one man to support the just, and lawful, and necessary authority of the supreme legislature of the British nation over all the dominions of the Crown. The justice of their cause will give vigour to their measures; and the Colonies that shall have the folly and presumption to resist them, will be quickly reduced to obedience.

F I N I S.